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Most studies of the advent of computers and the computer industry, such as those by Stern
and Flamm, have tended to focus on the technology and its inventors and vendors, along with
early government and defense users [1]. Commercial users are typically viewed as minor and
peripheral players, considered seriously primarily in studies that focus on the workers whose jobs
were affected by computerization [2]. Recently, however, increasing attention is beginning to be
paid to users and their innovations, adoptions, and adaptations of information technology. James
McKenney and his colleagues, for example, have looked at the important role played by Bank of
America and American airlines, both large firms in major user industries, in the evolution of new,
specialized applications of information technology in the 1960s [3]. Dirk de Wit and Jan van den
Ende have examined the role of past history, managerial ideologies, and organizational cultures in
organizations adopting and adapting computer technology in the Netherlands [4]. Others, such as
Arthur L. Norberg, Martin Campbell-Kelly, and James W. Cortada, have examined the
predecessors of computing equipment, punched card tabulators, and the role of users in the
shaping of technology and markets [5]. My own work on the earlier history of insurance industry
influence on and use of pre-computer technology, which forms the backdrop for this look at
insurance industry interaction with the computer industry in its earliest years, also falls into this
category of work [6]. In a recent special edition of the Annals commemorating "50 Years of
Computing," several authors include or even focus on commercial applications in their
1 This paper is an outgrowth of one segment of a paper originally presented at the annual convention of
the Society for the History of Technology (SHOT) in October, 1993, and later presented to the Seminar
in Science, Technology, and Society at MIT in September 1993; and at the Hagley Research Seminar,
Wilmington, DE, April, 1995. I gratefully acknowledge comments from participants in all of these
seminars.
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contributions [7]. James Cortada, in particular, focuses on commercial use and calls for more
industry-specific studies of early computer use. This paper provides one such study.
This new focus on the role of users in the history of computing, especially commercial
(rather than solely government or university) users, is part of several broader movements in history
and administrative sciences. The social construction approach, introduced into history of
technology and championed by Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch in their
1987 book, The Social Construction of Technological Systems [8], shifted focus from inventors to
the social systems (including users) around them, and from technical inventions to the broader
technological systems of which they were a part. From a different historical perspective, economic
historians such as Ross Thomson and Christine MacLeod have focused new attention on users and
their role in innovation and diffusion [9]. Scholars of the management of innovation, such as Eric
von Hippel and James M. Utterback, have similarly examined the role of users in this process
[10]. As part of that shift in attention towards users, this paper examines early interactions
between an industry that would become a major user of computers and the newly forming
computer industry.
As my work cited above has shown, the life insurance industry had been a major user of
the most direct commercial predecessor of computers, punched card tabulators, since before the
beginning of the twentieth century. For insurance firms, the processing of data was not ancillary
to the production of goods: information was their primary product, and information and document
processing formed the production line of the firm. Thus it is not surprising that this industry was
also one of first and largest commercial adopters of computer technology beginning in the mid-
1950s.2 Insurance interest in and involvement with computers began, however, even before
insurance firms began purchasing and using computers at that time. In his recent article, Cortada
2 According to an unsigned typed list of "Univacs Completed to Date" (8 Feb. 1956, Unisys Coll., 1956
chronological file), Hagley, one quarter (two out of eight) of the Univacs shipped to commercial firms
starting in 1954 went to insurance firms. This trend went beyond Univac; in 1955, for example, a Bureau
of Labor study cited insurance as making up 1/3 of the commercial customers for all computers. 2 See also
Cortada, "Commercial Applications."
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identified the period from 1945 to 1952 in computer history as one in which "Commercial uses
were nonexistent" (except in defense-related firms) and stated that "Businesses...did not see an
economic advantage in commercial applications of digital computers during this period" [11]. User
industries learned about technology "mainly through publications, later from vendors," and did not
really get involved with this technology until 1952 and after. A close look at one particular user
industry shows, however, that key individuals and industry groups in the life insurance industry
were ahead of this timetable.
This paper highlights some of the intensive interactions between individuals, firms, and
insurance industry associations, on the one hand, and individuals and firms in the incipient
computer industry, on the other, in the 1940s and up through 1952, during Cortada's first period
and before the first computer was delivered to an insurance firm in 1954. This interaction shows
how pioneers in this user industry viewed computer technology and their potential use of it, as well
as their attempts to influence its developments in particular directions. Unlike the banking and
airline stories told by McKenney, the insurance story does not end with the creation of a new
computer product specialized to the needs of that industry or a firm in it, a route that some of the
insurance firms had attempted in the tabulator era with unhappy results [12]. Instead, it shows
their influence on and ideas about using computer equipment that would be more general purpose
in nature, and thus attractive to other commercial users.
After a brief review of earlier interactions between insurance users and vendors in the
tabulator era, this paper will focus first on Prudential's early computer expert and proselytizer
Edmund C. Berkeley, and his interactions with the embryonic computer industry in the late 1940s.
Then it will examine a broader industry effort by a special committee of the Society of Actuaries,
led by representatives of Metropolitan Life. Both sets of actors played important roles in educating
their own firms and the life insurance industry as a whole about the potential uses of computers for
insurance, as well as communicating that industry's needs, especially in the areas of rapid
input/output and verification needed for routine transactions processing, to computer vendors.
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Insurance and the Tabulator Era
As I have explored in an earlier paper,3 the life insurance industry, as represented by its
firms and its industry organizations, exhibited an early and enduring interest in punch card
tabulating, beginning in 1890, the year in which Herman Hollerith's still-primitive tabulating
system was first used to tabulate results of the U.S. Census, and continuing through the 1950s.
Early tabulating technology included electro-mechanical and mechanical equipment for recording
structured data on punched cards, sorting and counting this data by fields, and adding amounts in a
designated field. The largest insurance firms, especially, needed a better way to handle their
voluminous and long-held records. Thus they were among the very first commercial adopters of
the technology, as well as among the most important user-groups shaping the technology as it
evolved.
Initially, the insurance firms adopted tabulating technology simply to speed up manual
processes of sorting, counting, and adding numerical data, and directly (through in-house
innovations) and indirectly (through market decisions of firms and professional associations)
encouraged developments that improved those functions. Most routine insurance functions,
however, ultimately involved less calculation and more creation of transactional and control
documents such as premium bills and internal management reports.
Thus from around 1910 on, insurance firms and industry groups used the same direct and
indirect mechanisms to encourage Hollerith and his competitors in their development first of
numerical printing capability, then of alphabetical sorting and printing capabilities. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company, the largest insurance firm in the world, contracted with an independent
inventor, J. Royden Peirce, in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to develop customized
alphabetical printing tabulator equipment for that firm. Peirce's ideas for integrating multiple
insurance functions using such technology were ahead of his time, but his mechanical abilities to
3 This section is summarized from Yates, "Co-evolution of Information Processing Technology and Use,"
where each development is documented in detail. Only information not documented in that article is
documented here.
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realize the necessary machines were not. More importantly for most insurance users and
technology vendors, insurance firms were among the earliest and most enthusiastic purchasers of
the competing Powers printing and then alphabetical tabulators when they came on the market
between 1915 and the early 1920s. In fact, in 1919 the largest British life insurance firm (the
Prudential Assurance Company, unrelated to the Prudential Insurance Company in the U.S.)
intervened directly, buying the British Powers agency and worked with it to develop the first
successful alphabetical tabulating and printing machines; this technology was soon modified and
introduced by Powers in America. Hollerith's successor firm (which became IBM in 1924) was
forced to play catch-up, developing its own printing capabilities by around 1920 and (after
becoming IBM in 1924) alphabetical capabilities by 1930.
In 1928 IBM moved from a 45-column to a patented 80-column card, allowing more data
per card but introducing the first definitive incompatibility between IBM and Remington Rand
(which now owned Powers) machinery. By the end of the 1920s IBM had purchased Peirce's
patents and introduced its own alphabetical printing capability. Having caught up with and
surpassed Remington Rand, it stayed safely ahead (establishing a sales advantage of about eight to
one in the 1930s) through the rest of the tabulator era, at the beginning of the 1950s controlling
90% of all installed punched-card equipment in the U.S. [13]. In line with this general trend,
many insurance firms, including such giants as Metropolitan Life and the American Prudential as
well as many smaller firms, acquired large installations of IBM tabulating equipment by the 1930s.
With their new capabilities, tabulators could be used to accomplish a wider range of insurance
functions, and, in a few cases, to integrate these functions. For premium billing, for example,
tabulators could be used to compute and print premiums due and policyholder names on the
notices; in some cases this was combined with premium accounting functions for an integrated
application.
From the 1930s into the 1950s, incremental improvements of tabulating equipment (by this
time frequently referred to as electric accounting machines or EAMs, based on internal IBM
parlance reflecting a common category of application that spanned many industries [14]) continued,
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often developed by IBM in close collaboration with customers in the insurance industry and other
user industries. These improvements allowed the use of alphabetical printing more rapidly and
with a wide array of continuous forms and carbon sets to achieve a range of internal and policy-
holder documents. By the early 1950s, a Dallas-area regional survey of premium billing and
accounting methods presented to a meeting of the Insurance Accounting and Statistical Association
(IASA) showed a considerable increase in use of tabulating equipment for billing and related
accounting functions, with over 40% of the firms surveyed using tabulating equipment for the
entire premium billing and accounting process, including generating receipts, commission
statements, and control checking [15].4
By the early 1950s, IBM's calculating punches, both traditional electro-mechanical models
and the new 600-series electronic models with vacuum tubes but no stored-program capability
(introduced in 1948 [16]) were also being used increasingly for applications involving more
calculations, such as renewal commission accounting, dividend calculations and accounting, and
actuarial calculations [17]. These devices could be wired to conduct a brief sequence of
calculations (limited by the wiring's capacity to hold pre-selected numbers and by the 80-column
format of the cards) for a particular application; the calculation ended with the punching of a
calculated figure onto a card. This newly punched figure could then be used as input into other,
separately run operations such as premium billing and payroll generation. Thus new developments
in calculating and input/output for punched-card tabulating equipment were making it possible for
life insurance firms interested in reorganizing their business processes to integrate what had
previously been several separate steps.
As Bashe et al, historians of IBM's early computers, note, "Insurance companies were
among the largest and most sophisticated business users of punched-card machines in the late
4 Based on a cross referencing of as many as possible of the firms named in the write-up of the survey
with 1937 data in Stalson, Marketing Life Insurance (1942), the companies surveyed were
predominantly stock companies, but included a few mutuals, as well. Stock companies predominated in
both those firms using tabulating equipment and those using other methods such as the addressograph.
Industry association studies, which tended to include more mutual companies, showed a similar trend.
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1940s and 1950s" [18]. As a major user industry, life insurance certainly was shaped by as well
as playing a significant role in shaping, tabulating technology in a co-evolution of information
technology and its use. In addition, the on-going interaction between this major user industry and
the technology vendors shaped both industries. Insurance business processes in many firms were
built around tabulating equipment and cards rather than printed records; cards became a significant
and familiar storage and manipulation medium for this information-intensive business. On the
vendor side, IBM and its competitors learned to work closely with major user industries such as
insurance, developing products in response to the needs they voiced. This earlier era and the close
relations established between insurance users, on the one hand, and tabulating technology and
vendors, on the other, set the stage for early interactions between insurance users and the new
computer industry.
Setting the Stage: Before, During, and Immediately After the War
Insurance interest in computers, like that in tabulators, started early. Even before World
War II, during which the developments in this area were radically accelerated by war needs, hints
of this interest had appeared. As early as 1936, for example, E. William Phillips, a British actuary
and the General Manager for Great Britain of Manufacturers Life, presented a paper, printed in the
British Journal of the Institute of Actuaries, arguing that actuaries should switch from a base-ten
system to octal or binary, in order to allow use of electronics in their calculations [19]. This paper
had an important influence on a few key players in the story to follow, including John J. Finelli of
Metropolitan Life [20]. As the next section demonstrates, Prudential's Edmund C. Berkeley was
also involved in this area of study before World War II. During the war, many mathematically-
trained actuaries and other insurance employees were recruited to work on military projects
involving statistics and operations research [21]. They were involved in work such as improving
accuracy of bombsights; working with Army statistics on casualty rates, personnel structure,
retirement benefits; creating a strategy for anti-submarine warfare [22], and code breaking. In all
of these areas, their work typically involved working with large-scale IBM data processing
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installations, though most of the technology was of the tabulator era. A few actuaries (such as
Berkeley) worked directly with the new computer technology being developed during the war. In
either case this experience, according to a historian of the actuarial profession, gave them "prompt
appreciation of the potential in electronic computers" after the war [23].
In the immediate post-war era, the life insurance industry as a whole experienced rapid
growth, and the cost of clerical labor grew rapidly, as well. Between 1948 and 1953, according to
a Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) study, the number of insurance policies in force (which is a
better measure of the volume of data processing work than is the monetary value of insurance in
force) rose over 24%, and total employment in the life insurance industry grew almost 14%, as
compared to just under 12% for total non-farm employment in the U.S. [24]. It also noted that
insurance firms (including the one studied in detail in this BLS study, probably Metropolitan Life)
had faced recurrent labor shortages in lower levels of clerical jobs since 1940. With already
extensive use of pre-computer punched card tabulating equipment, a growing volume of
information to handle, growing labor costs of information handling, and the exposure of many
actuaries to new data processing uses and in some cases new computer technology, the insurance
industry's interest in computing developments was not at all surprising.
Two post-war developments illustrate early interactions between insurance and developing
computer technology, demonstrating the life insurance industry's view of, interest in, and
influence on these technological developments: in 1946, the Prudential's Edmund Berkeley
initiated serious discussions within his firm and with potential vendors on the technical
specifications required to make computers useful for insurance applications, and in 1947 the
Society of Actuaries 5 established a committee to examine insurance applications of the new
technology. Although both of these developments had unique aspects, neither was an isolated
anomaly. Berkeley's intense and often technical involvement was paralleled by that of John J.
Finelli of Metropolitan Life, one of the founding members of the Society of Actuaries committee,
5 At the time the committee was founded, the association was called the Actuarial Society, but soon
after it became the Society of Actuaries (Moorhead, Our Yesterdays, p. 344).
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and that committee had counterparts in the Life Office Management Association (LOMA) and the
Insurance Accounting and Statistical Association (IASA). Yet these two developments serve to
demonstrate the nature of such interactions and some of the influences on insurance and on the
early computer industry.
Early Insurance Involvement with Computers: The Prudential's Berkeley
Edmund C. Berkeley joined the Prudential in the Actuarial Department in 1938 [25]. As
early as 1939 Berkeley, later described by Prudential colleagues as "a nut," "a genius," and "the
most meticulous man I ever knew,"6 was studying the potential uses of computing machinery
(generally electromechanical at this point) and methods in insurance. In 1939, he visited Bell
Laboratories to see George Stibitz's calculator, which he judged not to be applicable to insurance
work [26]. In a series of memoranda and reports in 1941-42, Berkeley explored possible
applications of symbolic logic (in particular Boolean algebra) to the Prudential's work [27]. In
what appears to be one of his earliest documents on this work, he stated that the "the end product
of the application of symbolic logic in a territory should be an algebra," then listed several such
territories [28]. The first of these is now recognizable as a predecessor of computer programming
for insurance applications:
Algebra of electric accounting punch card operations: which will deal with the operations
under which punch cards are manipulated by International Business Machines. These
operations include coding, punching, sorting, tabulating, reproducing, collating, etc. If a
successful algebra is constructed, the most efficient and economical chain of machine
operations to perform a given job will be able to be determined mathematically, and similar
problems will be solved mathematically. This algebra (which will probably not be called an
algebra at all) will probably be applied as a supplementary shorthand by experienced
machine men in Departments equipped with IBM machines.
6 Quoted in Blair E. Olmstead, "Prudential's Early Experience with Computers" (Prudential internal
typescript dated February 1, 1978); Berkeley's meticulousness is born out by the voluminous and
detailed records he left, now in the Edmund C. Berkeley Collection, Charles Babbage Institute
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
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During the same period, Berkeley also engaged in discussions with Bell Labs about its
electrical relay computing machine and General Electric about the "electric network calculating
machine" it was experimenting with [29]. His reports from these contacts indicate that these
potential vendors were learning about market needs from him at the same time that he was learning
more about the technology. For example, in his report of the visit to General Electric's labs in
Schenectady, NY, he records:
[T]hese men first wanted to know how we thought their machines might solve problems
for us. I explained that my present purpose was to search out the correspondence between
mechanical operations, abstract operations, and the operations taking place in an insurance
company, with a view to a variety of applications of machines and abstract systems to
insurance company problems ....Mr. Kuehni inquired if we would be willing to pay from
$100,000 to $250,000 for the development and production of a new machine. I said that,
depending on clerical and other savings computed on reasonable assumptions, we would
be willing, and that we were now paying an amount of that order in each year for [renting
IBM] punch card machines and equipment. [30]
Further discussion centered on specific examples Berkeley provided of insurance tasks, such as
classifying underwriting risks. In the ensuing discussion of coding and sorting rules, Berkeley
pointed out the need, for such applications, of a machine that handled discontinuous, Boolean
algebra, rather than an analog machine such as GE's electric network calculating machine. So even
in this early period, Berkeley was clarifying his own thinking about potential uses of computing
machinery and decision criteria for assessing such devices. Moreover, he was providing market
information about a large potential user firm and industry to vendors.
Berkeley spent the period from 1942-46 serving in the Naval Reserves, stationed for part
of that time at Harvard, where he observed the use of the Mark I computer developed jointly by
Harvard's Howard Aiken and IBM, and worked with Aiken on constructing the Mark II automatic
sequence controlled calculator [31]. When he returned to Prudential in 1946, Berkeley became a
Methods Analyst, focusing on how to improve the methods and systems by which work was
accomplished at Prudential, rather than returning to the more narrowly focused Actuarial
Department. Berkeley's investigations into new computing technology were now central to his
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activities. For example, he reported that from August 1 to December 31, 1946, he initiated a total
of 60 visits with individuals or groups to discuss applications of the new computing technologies
to insurance [32].
As a result of these activities, he wrote a series of reports including one entitled "Sequence
Controlled Calculators for the Prudential - Specifications - First Draft, November, 1946" [33]. By
this time he had clearly determined that his company should order one of these computing devices.
This report represents his first of many attempts to formulate and communicate his firm's needs to
the nascent computer industry. Many of his tentative specifications would turn out to be simple to
meet and exceed with the new electronic technology, as will be seen below, while others would not
be met for decades (e.g., his demand for unattended
overnight operation of the machine). Still others would influence computer vendors (particularly
the makers of the Univac) in their development of a general-purpose commercial computing
machine. This draft illustrates that Berkeley had complete faith that new "large scale calculating
machines" or "sequence controlled calculators" would soon be introduced into business and
"become indispensable." Significantly, he closed the report with the following interesting
"specification":
There should be close cooperation at all stages between the manufacturer and the Company
[Prudential], in regard to the design and development of the machine and other features, so
as to make the fullest use in the Company of all applications of devices developed for the
machine, etc.
In this passage he revealed the importance he placed on the interaction between user and
technology developer. He was not simply waiting for a commercial product to reach the market--he
was determined that he and the Prudential would play a role in shaping the development of a
product for its use.
In addition, on December 6, 1946, Berkeley ran what he claimed to be the first insurance
problem ever to be run on a sequence controlled calculator, a problem which involved a complex
set of table look-ups and computations to compute the costs for a change of policy, using the Bell
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Laboratories general purpose relay calculator [34]. He went on to explain that "The purpose of this
trial was to prove beyond the shadow of a doubt that a sequence controlled calculator can easily
perform an insurance company calculation with many successive steps," a goal he achieved. Thus
as early as this, Berkeley was examining the types of insurance processes that could be aided by a
computer and experimenting with the logical sequences of steps needed to accomplish such
processes.
Berkeley's Educational Mission
During the first half of 1947, Berkeley's activities revolved around two missions: educating
the Prudential's management as well as the insurance industry at large about the technology, and
communicating with potential vendors about the Prudential's needs. On the educational front, he
continued to write reports and memos educating his superiors about the nature of the rapidly
evolving technology and its potential applications to insurance, as well as possible methods of
paying for its development [35]. His list of potential insurance applications for a sequence
controlled calculator ranged from actuarial problems involving complex calculations but limited
outputs to routine operations with little calculation but considerable input and output, such as the
premium billing process handled by tabulating equipment at many firms.7 In early 1947, he also
considered various modes of financing development, from cooperating with other insurance
companies or government agencies to doing it alone, spelling out advantages and disadvantages of
each [36]. He reached a preliminary conclusion that the government had already funded much
development, and that expecting a single manufacturer to finance the rest of the development would
7 Stern ("From ENIAC to UNIVAC") asserts that changes in the Geurtin Law requiring the re-
computation of life experience tables pushed Prudential's investigation into computers; Berkeley's
papers from this period, however, do not even mention this application, but focus on a wider range of
applications, especially premium billing. According to Malcolm MacKinnon, in an oral history
interview by Bob Hancke, August 30, 1994, the Guertin Law required only a one-time recalculation of
tables at the beginning of 1948), not an ongoing increase in computational requirements, making it an
even more unlikely spur for Prudential's interest.
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result in slow, uncertain, and costly development. Thus an association of large potential purchasers
of such equipment would be most advantageous.
He also extended his educational mission outside of the Prudential into the broader
insurance community via presentations to several insurance associations. In a paper presented to
the Society of Actuaries in May, entitled "Electronic Machinery for Handling Information, and Its
Uses in Insurance" [37], he described the new technology by analogy to calculators and punched
card tabulators, connected in series, with a pre-set sequence of operations, and requiring no human
movement of information from one to the next. He asserted that the current $100,000-$125,000
cost of such computing machines, as quoted to him by vendors, was much less than that for a
comparable tabulating set-up and its operators, and described the range of possible insurance
applications, as he had done for his own management. He ended by mentioning the two key
motives that insurance companies would continue to cite for adopting computers: reductions in
clerical labor and the ability to undertake calculations not feasible in the past. Three other members
of the association (Mssrs. Barber, Wells, and Rieder) commented on the paper, showing a range
of visions of what this new technology could do for the actuarial profession and the insurance
industry [38]. Barber and Rieder underscored Berkeley's emphasis on the ability not just to
process information more rapidly, but also to rethink what information is processed and how.
Rieder noted favorably Berkeley's observation that the actuarial formulas developed in the
nineteenth century were selected in great part for ease of manual computation and extended it: "If
this thought is carried far enough, we arrive at the surprising conclusion that the whole structure of
life insurance as we know it to-day can, in large measure, be traced to computation limitations."
He went on to speculate about how certain common insurance practices might change once this
new electronic computational machinery was available to the industry. Berkeley's work (along
with that of the Actuarial Society's committee, also mentioned by Barber) clearly stimulated the
thinking of other actuaries about potential uses of computers.
In addition to his presentation at the Actuarial Society, Berkeley extended his educational
efforts to two other insurance associations. In 1947, Berkeley also presented a paper to the
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Insurance Accounting and Statistical Association on using computers to aid in insurance
underwriting [39]. In the same year, he also presented a more general paper about "Electronic
Sequence Controlled Calculating Machinery, and Applications in Insurance" to the Life Office
Management Association (LOMA)[40]. Although this title is quite similar to that of his Actuarial
Society paper, here he focused more on the nuts and bolts of computers and how they would
reduce the costs of office management for life insurance firms. After a brief description of the
principles and components of such equipment, he listed several new types of devices, not yet in
existence, that insurance offices would need to go with the computer itself: translator devices
between magnetic tape and other media (printing devices, card or paper tape), a verifier to check
information on one magnetic tape against that on another, and a selector device to allow rapid
selection of information on a magnetic tape. Again, he was creating a larger group of insurance
managers educated in what would be needed to use computers in commercial settings such as
insurance. He listed a wide variety of potential applications, but focused in on how such
machinery could be used in one specific application, maintaining a medical index. He also noted
the activities of a recently formed LOMA committee, called the Electronic Sequence Controlled
Calculator Committee, which he had been instrumental in founding [41]. At this early point the
Committee's activities already included four meetings and two visits to existing experimental
computers at Harvard and the Moore School. During this period, then, he proselytized in the
insurance industry at large, as well as within Prudential, sharing his growing understanding of the
nature and potential of computers with his colleagues in at least three insurance associations.8
8 This sharing of knowledge about the new technology with others in the industry had occurred during
the tabulator era (Yates, "Co-evolution of Information Processing Technology and Use") and was to be
characteristic of the early computer era, as well. Berkeley's and the Prudential's policy on this is
spelled out in a list of questions prepared for a meeting at around the time the Prudential signed the
original development contract with Eckert and Mauchly (13 May 1947, Berkeley, "Electronic
Machinery for Handling Information -- Policy Discussion," also designated "List of Some Questions for
Discussion at Meeting Called for May 14, 1947,... in Mr. F. B. Gerhard's Office," Berkeley Coll. 8:55,
CBI). In a section entitled "Spreading of Information," Berkeley made clear that the current policy was
to share with those interested "any general nonconfidential knowledge or expectations we have about
facts, experimental results, and possibilities," while keeping confidential details of particular
proposals from vendors, instead giving questioners the names of the suppliers for pursuing more detailed
inquiries. This willingness to share information about technology use (as well as about many other
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Berkeley's Communication with Vendors
In addition to these educational missions, Berkeley also began talking seriously to potential
vendors about developing a sequence controlled calculator or computer for the Prudential,
soliciting and receiving a series of proposals responding to his initial draft specifications and
conversations. Engineering Research Associates, Inc. (ERA), for example, proposed that the
Prudential, possibly in conjunction with Metropolitan Life (with whom ERA was also talking),
sponsor the development of such a sequence controlled calculator or a more special purpose
insurance calculator. Proposals also came from Raytheon, Electronic Control Company (ECC),
later renamed Eckert-Mauchly Computer Company (EMCC), and others 42]. Berkeley had talked
with John W. Mauchly of ECC at the Symposium on Large Scale Digital Calculating Machinery
that he attended at the Harvard Computational Laboratory on January 7-10, 1947 [43], and initiated
extensive follow-up correspondence with him.9 In addition to the detailed formal proposal, there
was on-going informal correspondence between Berkeley and John Mauchly to discuss details of
the proposal [44]. Of the potential vendors, Berkeley favored ECC, because of both the specificity
of its proposal for developing the Univac and the extent of its relationship with him, apparently
cultivated by both sides. By May 16, Prudential had received a second proposal from ECC, taking
into account this informal correspondence. lo
topics) is also evidenced in the published proceedings of several insurance associations, including the
Insurance Accounting and Statistical Association (IASA), the Life Office Management Association
(LOMA), and the various actuarial societies. Moorhead, Our Yesterdays (p. 345), also comments on this
trait with regard to Finelli's sharing of his experiences at Metropolitan Life with the British Institute
of Actuaries.
9 In a 13 March 1947 letter, J.W. Mauchly to E.C. Berkeley (in Accession 1825, Unisys Records, Box 48, in
Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, DE [hereafter Unisys 48, Hagley]), Mauchly refers to
Berkeley's "three memoranda dated January 13, January 28 and February 27." The two men may have
met even before this point, but the correspondence makes clear that they certainly interacted at this
symposium.
10 The two-part report is described in a memo from Berkeley to F. B. Gerhard, C. B. Laing, R. W. Cobb,
and E. F. Cooley [24 May 1947, Berkeley Coll. 8:55, CBI] as having two parts. The first part, my focus
here, is "Application of High Speed Computing Machines to Certain Problems of the Prudential Life
Insurance Company" by Electronic Control Company, 16 May 1947, Unisys 48, Hagley.
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Berkeley clearly demonstrated his desire to shape ECC's Univac, still in development at
this point, to assure that it met Prudential's needs. He recognized that in choosing this option, he
was electing to go with a general purpose computing machine, rather than a special purpose one
developed for life insurance. In fact, in subsequent correspondence negotiating the exact terms and
wording of the contract, Berkeley noted to Eckert and Mauchly that Harvard's Aiken had approved
of Prudential's decision, but also had suggested that special purpose machinery designed for
insurance might be even more useful. Berkeley went on to reassure them, however, that "we are
convinced that we should have general purpose machinery" [45]. Nevertheless, the desire to shape
this general purpose machine remained. As Arthur Norberg has noted in relation to ECC's second
proposal "the role of the customer in helping to set objectives is fairly explicit" [46].
The initial, February proposal illustrates the issues where, at ECC's invitation, the
Prudential was applying pressure on developments. In one section of the first version of the
proposal, ECC used a two-column format to display Berkeley's specifications against ECC's
ability to fulfill them. On most internal computational issues, ECC's specifications already
surpassed those proposed by Berkeley. l Only in his desire for rapid random access to stored
tables did Berkeley's computational desires exceed what ECC felt it could easily deliver. There, the
problems of searching sequentially accessed tape posed problems. Berkeley's desires in the area
of input and output, however, caused definite difficulties for ECC. For example, Berkeley wanted
an auxiliary machine for translating data and instructions into some special medium readable by
humans as well as by machines (he suggests punched paper tape) to allow checking of input. At
this point, Eckert and Mauchly envisioned direct entry of policy information onto magnetic tape via
keytape recorders, and they saw this tape as the sole storage medium. They noted that magnetic
11 Stern states that Prudential was not initially interested in a general purpose high-speed central
processor--only in high-speed input and output equipment. With the added materials provided by the
CBI's Berkeley Collection, we can see that this is a misreading of Prudential's position. Berkeley was
clearly interested in a general purpose central processor, as we can see from his specifications.
Realistically, however, he knew that for the type of work insurance needed, having processing speeds
that greatly exceeded input-output speeds was useless. To apply a computer to the transactional aspects
of the insurance business, such as premium billing, required millions of very short sets of computations or
manipulations followed by output of an almost equal number of documents.
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tape was not readable by humans, but it could be sent through a printer and printed out for
checking. Moreover, the passage went on to suggest:
Proof-reading by visual methods and other methods which involve human scanning of the
entire data for detection of errors are not in general to be recommended. More efficient
methods of detecting and correcting errors can be devised for use with this equipment.
Berkeley was not convinced. Both verification of input and visible output remained important for
him. Finally, machine accuracy or reliability was also an item for which Berkeley lists desired
specifications (no more than one machine error/failure per month), a specification Eckert and
Mauchly claimed to be able to achieve.
The input issue arose again in the section on insurance applications. In this section, Eckert
and Mauchly also considered how their machine could handle three types of problems the
Prudential (and other insurance firms) faced: premium billing, mortality studies, and group
insurance. Of these, they noted that the premium billing application was the largest, the most
interesting, and the most likely to generate cost savings. Implementing such an application would,
of course, require a large up-front conversion. While they saw direct entry onto magnetic tape as
the probable method of a one-time conversion, they also noted that the Prudential, which had not
yet converted its premium billing to tabulating equipment, "could start now to convert the
information onto punched cards with IBM or Remington Rand punch machines. The information
on these punched cards could then be converted onto the tape by readers at a later date." 12 This may
have been the beginning of ECC's realization, which would grow rapidly in the next two years as
the young firm interacted with more insurance companies, that direct entry and the abandonment of
all cards was not an attractive option to many insurance (and other commercial) firms already using
extensive tabulating installations. As a subsequent section demonstrates, Berkeley was more
accepting of magnetic tape than many others in the insurance industry, but even he wanted the data
12 While the Prudential used a great deal of IBM punch-card equipment by this time, its premium
billing operation was not handled by such equipment (Olmstead, pp. 7-9). A retrospective account of its
subsequent testing and conversion of this application first to IBM tabulating equipment around 1950 and
then to an IBM 702 computer in 1955 refers to the old system as a "manual system" (Olmstead, p. 9),
though that is undoubtedly an exaggeration. The dividends, for example, were calculated by
tabulating equipment, and the bills were probably produced by Addressograph machines.
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to take a visible form, as well. As the Society of Actuaries study described below suggested and
subsequent history confirmed, most firms were loath to give up the visible punched holes on cards
for the invisible electric charges of magnetic tape. Most insurance firms would not abandon cards
as a mainstay of their data operations for almost two decades, and some kept them until quite
recently for limited uses [47]. ECC and its successors, EMCC and the Univac Department of
Remington Rand, would have to develop a line of card-to-tape and tape-to-card devices to support
input-output operations.
A few days after receiving ECC's second proposal, Berkeley wrote his superiors
recommending that the Prudential inform ECC of its intent to sign a development contract with that
firm [48]. He based his support of the proposal on several factors. He argued that "[s]uccess
[was] [v]ery [l]ikely," "[slaving [v]ery [g]reat," and "[p]urchase [p]rice [l]ow" (in fact, he claimed
that "This whole purchase cost [ignoring a one-time conversion cost] is less than 1/2 year's annual
rent paid to International Business Machines for the punch card equipment used in the Company").
Berkeley also argued that Eckert and Mauchly could achieve reliability of internal computer
operations "of the order of not more than two or three brief mechanical failures a week," a
conservative estimate less than his specifications and ECC's claims, but adequate to convince his
superiors. Also cited in ECC's favor was the fact that the young firm had other governmental and
commercial customers also contributing to development, including the Bureau of the Census,
Northrop Aircraft Co. and, as soon as a pending contract was signed, A.C. Nielsen Co., thus
assuring that the cost of development would be shared with a group of commercial firms.
In addition, Berkeley argued that ECC had not only the scientific knowledge to create such
a machine, but also the best "understanding of our problem as a business problem instead of a
scientific problem" of the firms working to develop such machines at that time: "For example, they
alone of our prospective suppliers wished to come and survey in a day or two our typical problems
at no cost to us, saying it would be very valuable to them to know if their machine could not handle
our problems." Probably as a partial consequence of their lack of such knowledge of business
applications, other potential suppliers of computers such as Raytheon, ERA, and the Moore
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School, Berkeley noted, "have hardly begun to investigate thoroughly input and output devices,
large automatic files, etc. for business applications." While IBM would be better known for its
industry-oriented development and marketing efforts in subsequent years, at this point Berkeley
also felt that ECC was more proactive in its approach to this representative of what would be a
major market segment for the computer industry. 13 In his recommendation, he argued that such a
contract would provide salutary " [c]ompetition for IBM. "
Indeed, if Berkeley clearly favored ECC, he had even more clearly rejected IBM as a
potential supplier of these new types of machines. In a confidential memo and notes for a meeting
that Berkeley wrote a few days before receiving the second ECC proposal, he had laid out a series
of objections to IBM [49]. He argued that because of IBM's stake in current tabulating equipment,
"it would be excessively costly to IBM to quickly introduce more modem machinery using
electronics and magnetic tape instead of relays and punch cards." Indeed, "IBM has a record of
long delay (or suppression) in the introduction of new devices." He criticized IBM reliability and
engineering design as well, specifically pointing to problems Aiken had experienced with the IBM-
built Mark I, causing the complete redesign of the relays for Mark II. Finally, he noted IBM's
policy of secrecy about new developments until devices were ready for the market, a factor that
may well have loomed large for someone like Berkeley, who wanted to be involved in
developments in this area. All in all, he judged that "there is no prospect of modem electronic
machinery from IBM before the next four or five years elapse and probably much longer." 14 While
his indictment is damning, his desire to make a radical break with IBM and the tabulating
technology of the past was extreme for the insurance industry, as subsequent widespread insurance
13 According to Olmstead's account, even when Thomas Watson, Jr., met with Prudential's top
management a few years later to tell them that "IBM would be developing electronic computers," IBM
"made [it] clear that, unlike Eckert-Mauchly, IBM would not be interested in Prudential's suggestions
for desired characteristics of the equipment (p. 11).
14 While his assessment of the time frame was not far off (IBM made its 701 scientific machine
commercially available at the end of 1952, almost 6 years later), he was implicitly assuming that
other firms (especially ECC) would develop commercially available machines more rapidly than they
did. It was, in fact, at least that long before any computers were available for other than government or
university use.
19
adoptions of IBM 650 punched card computers made clear.15 A list of questions and issues he
wrote out for himself in preparing for his meeting with a vice president and other superiors
indicated that even then, his superiors were considering additional, opposing factors, including
"possible decline in the value of our investment in IBM" (Prudential was a major source of funds
for IBM at that timel6) and "possible pull by IBM at the time we approach the Board of Directors
for authorization."
The Contract and Beyond
Berkeley evidently carried his point concerning ECC, for within two weeks, Prudential
assured Eckert and Mauchly that it intended to enter into a contract, and started a series of
negotiations that resulted in a development contract for what would become the Univac, dated 4
August 1947 [50]. The contract as signed had a series of developmental milestones but an option
rather than a commitment to buy a machine after the development phase. It also included
arrangements by which EMCC (as it soon was renamed) would pay back Prudential's share of
development costs once the Univac was being sold to other customers. Interestingly, the contract
included card-to-tape and tape-to-card devices, indicating the Prudential's decision not to go solely
with direct entry to magnetic tape and forcing EMCC to develop such devices. An earlier report
from EMCC to the Prudential had noted,
It is agreed that it is desirable for Prudential to be able to convert data stored on punched
cards into data stored on magnetic tape, should the UNIVAC System be installed. It would
be inefficient to have any reasonably large amount of data transferred by means of a human
operator and keyboard. The logical solution therefore is to design and construct a device
15 The 1956 program for the Electronics Session of the Proceedings of the Insurance Accounting and
Statistical Association provides a clear picture of the 650's immediate popularity in the industry: it
contains two papers on Univac applications and seventeen on 650 applications.
16 In fact, by around 1957, according to Thomas J. Watson Jr. (and Peter Petre, Father Son & Co.: My Life
at IBM and Beyond [NY: Bantam Books, 1990], p. 297), IBM had to issue new shares for sale on Wall
Street because "We'd borrowed as much as you could borrow--we owed the Prudential well over $300
million, which made us the biggest debtor in American business."
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which will read the holes punched on the cards, translate this into electrical impulses, and
then record these pulses on magnetic tape. [51]
In spite of the signing of this contract, and in a move probably required to satisfy his more
conservative superiors, Berkeley also pursued discussions with IBM about new equipment
(primarily tabulating equipment, but with enough intentional vagueness on IBM's side to allow it
to include electronic equipment, as well) to handle its premium billing application, discussions
which eventually led to the conversion of the Prudential's premium billing and accounting to IBM
tabulating equipment around 1950 [52].
Over the months following the signing of the initial contract, EMCC constantly missed
milestones and renegotiated them with the Prudential [53]. In spite of these delays, and with
Berkeley's urging, in late 1948 Prudential signed a contract to purchase a Univac, which was to be
delivered in June of 1950.17 Meanwhile, in the summer of 1948, however, Berkeley had left the
Prudential to enter the newly emerging computer industry, leaving others to carry on his work,
though none as knowledgeable as he. 1'8
Delays continued from the purchase contract in 1948 through 1950, when Remington Rand
purchased EMCC [54]. Soon Remington Rand, recognizing that the Prudential's $150,000
contracted price was much too low, tried to renegotiate. In 1951, Remington Rand ultimately
succeeded in canceling its contract with Prudential (and with another early backer, A.C. Nielson),
by offering to return the $30,000 already paid on the initial developmental contract upon
cancellation, and at the same time by threatening to set up EMCC as a separate firm again and to
allow it to go into receivership if Prudential refused to cancel [55]. After Prudential agreed to
cancel the old contract, Remington Rand attempt to sell it a new Univac contract, this time for
$1,250,000, and the two firms worked together to conduct a test of a Univac application to handle
17 An undated draft of this purchase agreement may be found in Unisys 78, Hagley. Stern (From ENIAC
to UNIVAC, p. 286) states that it was signed on Dec. 8, 1948, but the internal report by Olmstead says
Prudential's Executive Committee approved the contract on November 23.
18 In fact, computer historians are more likely to recognize him as the author of Giant Brains, or
Machines That Think (NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1949) or as one of the founders of the Association for
Computing Machinery (ACM).
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premium billing and dividend and commission calculations. According to a later account,
however, after Prudential observed the apparently successful demonstration in December 1951, "It
was decided that the UNIVAC would not be economical for our use."19
Implications of Berkeley's Role
While Prudential did not ultimately install a Univac (it switched allegiance back to IBM),
and turned out not, in fact, to be one of the first handful of insurance firms to computerize,
Berkeley's activities clearly played an important role in early exploration of applications for
computers, the publicizing of such uses within his own firm and in the broader insurance industry,
and the conveyance of much information on insurance applications to the embryonic computer
industry. His early proselytizing to members of various insurance organizations helped shape
perceptions of what computers were and why and how they should be used in insurance firms. He
argued that with appropriate modifications to input and output peripherals, computers could be
used, not just for complicated calculations, but for the routine information and document
processing transactions then handled by tabulators and other office equipment. His early
movement away from actuarial and towards large operational applications was the first instance of
what would become a common movement, reflecting his and the insurance industry's desire to
reduce growth in clerical labor. Although new, previously impossible actuarial calculations were
intriguing, that was not where the largest initial gains lay for the firms. He, like many executives
of other insurance firms to follow him, initially thought more about speeding up existing processes
than reconfiguring them totally. He also demonstrated some of the factors insurance firms would
find important in their decisions to obtain particular computers as well as to use them for certain
types of applications. Berkeley was more willing to move directly to magnetic tape than many
19Olmstead, pp. 14, 17-18. While this account does not explain the reason for the lack of economy, it
does note that the premium billing application developed by Univac did not include accounting for
premium's received (p. 14), a capability already present in the premium billing and accounting system
newly converted from "manual" to IBM tabulating equipment around 1950.
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other insurance executives would prove to be, but he, too, saw the need for some visible medium
to supplement the invisible magnetic records.
Moreover, Berkeley and the Prudential had some influence on the development of the
Univac itself. A few years later, officials from Remington Rand were to give the insurance
industry, and Prudential by implication if not by name, a great deal of credit in shaping the Univac.
As George Boyd, General Manager for Insurance Markets at Remington Rand in 1950 [56], said a
few years later, "Almost from its inception in 1947, UNIVAC has been associated closely with
insurance. Specifications from one large life company [Prudential], one other commercial
company [A.C. Nielsen], and the Bureau of the Census, determined the completion of its design in
1949" [57] Another Univac official discussed more specifically what that computer's design owed
to studies conducted for these three organizations:
The results of these studies showed that while the arithmetic units which were common in
the many different computer developments at that time were quite adequate to do the
commercial processes needed, the primary requirement was to get data into the computer's
internal memory and arithmetic system rapidly, and get the computed results out rapidly;
that the computer mustn't be tied up to the slowest speeds of keyboard input devices, or
output printing devices; that these must be separate units and, furthermore, for commercial
work, that the equipment must be completely self checking. [58]
Indeed, we have seen that Berkeley and the Prudential put EMCC on notice, via the contract to
purchase a Univac, of its need to develop and make available card-to-tape and tape-to-card
converters for those firms that wanted to hedge their bets and maintain their card files. Moreover,
as the quotes above suggest, he helped shift the emphasis from internal computation, useful in
scientific and defense applications that had previously been the most important uses and potential
uses, to input and output devices and verifiers, forcing EMCC to confront these essentials for
insurance and many other commercial uses. Thus Berkeley was an important agent of insurance
influence on the emerging computer technology far before commercial influences are generally
assumed to be present.
Finally, he seems to have influenced the competitive dynamics of the computing industry.
By persuading the Prudential to back Eckert and Mauchly, he helped keep their efforts alive until
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they were taken over by Remington Rand in 1950. At the same time, he unintentionally motivated
IBM to greater efforts. In spite of the sop to IBM in the contract for converting premium billing
and accounting to IBM tabulating equipment, the Prudential's backing of Eckert and Mauchly came
as a shock to IBM. Thomas J. Watson, Jr., later noted that "The first UNIVAC wasn't due to be
ready for years, but with nothing more than a paper description Eckert and Mauchly won financial
backing from two of our ten biggest customers--the Census Bureau and Prudential Insurance--and
at least one other insurer besides. When Dad found out about that, his skepticism [about Eckert
and Mauchly's business venture] turned into fury." When Thomas J. Watson, Sr., questioned one
of his senior engineers about what he would do about the defection of the important insurance
industry and received what he considered an unsatisfactory answer, Watson replied, "We can't
think and intend when insurance companies are backing this outfit to build machines! [...] This
business wasn't built that way!" [59] From that time on, according to Thomas J. Watson, Jr., his
father focused seriously on the threat from computers and how IBM would answer it.
The Society of Actuaries Study of Computing
At the same 1947 meeting of the Actuarial Society (in 1948 renamed the Society of
Actuaries) at which Berkeley delivered his address on computers and their potential applications in
insurance, a committee of that association was formed to undertake a study of the potential of the
new electronic calculating equipment on the horizon. Initially constituted the Committee on Society
Participation in Development of Calculators and in 1948 renamed the Committee on New
Recording Means and Computing Devices, it was composed of two representatives of Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company (Malvin E. Davis, Vice-President and Actuary, who served as committee
chair; and John J. Finelli, Assistant Actuary), one from Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance
Company (William P. Barber, Jr.), and one from Equitable Life Assurance Society (Walter Klem,
Vice-President and Associate Actuary) [60]. Finelli was Metropolitan Life's parallel to Berkeley in
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computer involvement and expertise, though unlike Berkeley he stayed in the insurance business
for his entire career.20
Here, however, the activities of a life insurance association, not those of an individual, are
our focus. As noted above, both LOMA and IASA had similar committees; nevertheless, as a
representative of the most prestigious and the most professionalized segment of the insurance
industry [61], as well as that most involved in issues of calculation, the Actuarial Society
committee was initially a very visible representative of the insurance industry to vendors.
Moreover, its study is well-documented in a series of reports issued from 1952 to 1957 [62]. Its
early activities (through 1952) will be my focus here.
This committee's activities from its founding in 1947 to 1952 are described in its initial,
multi-part report of its activities and conclusions originally presented orally in 1952 to the Society
of Actuaries and to a Special Meeting arranged by the society but including some outside vendors
or potential vendors such as IBM and Remington Rand's Univac Division (p. v).21 This report,
which was subsequently produced in book form for distribution, reveals much of the interaction
that took place between the life insurance industry (as represented by the Society of Actuaries) and
the computing industry well before the first computers would actually be delivered to firms in
1954. Some of this activity involved communicating industry needs to vendor firms. As
Metropolitan Life's Malvin Davis, chairman of the committee, explained in his part of the report,
"We are not going to build this equipment. There are many manufacturers very much better
qualified to do that. What we can do is to know our job well enough to be able to tell about it in
terms that the manufacturers can use" (p. 25). Indeed, the Committee worked closely with at least
20 Finelli, according to the British Actuary Phillips, who had written the prescient 1936 paper on
adopting binary notation, was one of two individuals to ascribe fully to his 1936 argument for use of the
octal system to facilitate shift to electronic information handling when it was published, and from 1948
on, he "'lived' electronic computers, 'breathed, eaten and drunk,' and probably 'slept,' electronic
computers." [Phillips, "Finelli and Electronic Procedures," The Review of London, March 4, 1960, quoted
in Moorhead, p. 345.]
21 Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations in this section come from the Davis et al. 1952 report,
with page numbers given in parentheses in the text.
25
two firms which would be major vendors to the insurance industry in a later period; although the
two firms remain unnamed, internal and external evidence identifies them clearly as IBM and
Remington Rand's Univac Division. The report also provides considerable information on the
flow of information about computing into the insurance industry, and the early development and
spread within the insurance industry of ideas about how insurance might use this new machinery.
In this effort, Committee members essentially picked up where Berkeley left off when he left the
insurance industry (though their early activities actually overlapped with his late ones), educating
both vendors and the insurance community on the possible uses of this new technology in
insurance.
The Committee's Founding and Investigation
In describing why the committee was established, Davis, the chairman of the committee,
explained why the actuaries undertook this investigation of the new computing devices that had
emerged from the war:
Now one part of the insurance business where more than elementary arithmetic is applied is
in the actuarial part of the business, so naturally actuaries began to wonder whether such
computers could be of assistance to them. How was an actuary to find out? When he tried
to do so, he quickly learned that life insurance people and electronic engineers were two
groups who did not speak each other's language. He found electronic engineers quite
willing and anxious to have their ability and experience applied to the changes necessary to
take computers out of purely laboratory work and into the business world, but they were
lacking an adequate picture of the kind of facilities the business world needs. On the other
hand, actuaries and others in the life insurance field were also lacking a sufficient
understanding of the type of equipment which it would be reasonable to expect for
insurance use. It became apparent that some medium was necessary to bridge the gap
between the two. (p. 4)
Thus Davis and his committee, like Berkeley beginning even earlier, felt that two-way
communication between the vendors and life insurance companies was necessary. Davis went on
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to explain that actuaries chose to attempt the necessary bridging jointly through the Association to
save each firm from having to do it independently2 2:
Accordingly, four years ago the Society of Actuaries appointed a committee to examine into
the new recording means and computing devices which were becoming available and to
report when it felt that such devices had been developed sufficiently for business use so
that life insurance companies could consider their possible employment. (p. 4)
During the next four years, this Committee undertook extensive investigation both of developments
in equipment and of possible applications of that equipment to life insurance work. At the time of
the 1952 report, Davis noted, these machines were no longer
... purely computing machines capable only of a large amount of arithmetic. In recent years,
some very important improvements have converted them into machines capable of a wide
variety of operations. Nowadays we must think of them as information processing
machines with computing representing just a part of their total capabilities. (p. 5)
The Committee's activities would be a factor in this shift.
Davis's overview of the committee's activities included some simplified explanations of
how some of the new technologies worked, including, for example, magnetic tape and mercury
delay tubes, before turning to its central topic, insurance applications. The report itself did not
name specific vendors and tried to avoid favoring one type over another (particularly important
since both IBM and Remington Rand were in the audience for its presentation). However, after
mentioning that there were 25 to 30 electronic computing machines in existence (a number which
22 This was, in fact a common motive among insurance associations, even when not as highly
professionalized as the actuaries. For example, the introduction to the Reference Manual of the Life
Office Management Association (L.O.M.A., 1947, p. 1) of the same era explains that organization's
mandate: 'The Life Office Management Association is essentially a cooperative management research
organization whose primary objective is to assist in improving life office management through the
pooling of experience and research of its member companies ..... Much of the work done by the
Association would otherwise have to be undertaken by individual companies at a substantially greater
cost. The contributions in the form of dues and research participation may be viewed as an investment
upon which substantial returns will be realized over an indefinite period." This willingness to share
knowledge rather than use it for competitive advantage is explained as follows: "The fine spirit of
comity existent among life companies has made this possible." In the forward to the same LOMA
Manual (n.p.) this position is elaborated as a form of public service ideology: "Fortunately there exists
among our companies an enlightened appreciation of our social and economic responsibility in exercising
our trusteeship of the funds of our policyholders." Although all these associations included
representatives from mutual and stock companies, mutuals and their public service ideology tended to
dominate them (e.g., Moorhead, p. 135 and elsewhere).
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undoubtedly included some machines we would now consider electronic calculators rather than
computers), mostly of the punched card type, the explanations of the technology focused primarily
on the new elements, especially magnetic tape as a potential medium. In the Society study, as in
Berkeley's studies, they focused on input-output issues, as well as on the problems of sorting with
a sequential medium such as tape, programming, and verification of accuracy at various stages.
The input problem clearly seemed best addressed through card-to-tape converters, available by
1952, rather than through direct entry. The output issue, at least for magnetic tape computers, was
more problematic, but they felt it was on its way to a solution:
Today to convert answers which are in punched card form there exists the regular line of
tabulators which are very rapid printing mechanisms. A corresponding high speed printing
machine to read answers from magnetic tape does not exist. Magnetic tape information
must be converted to readable copy by a slow one-character-at-a-time typewriter which is
actuated by a magnetic tape reading mechanism and, because of the relatively high printing
cost involved through use of such a machine, it does not appear to be very useful on a large
volume of such work. Higher speed printers operating from tape, however, are in a very
advanced state of development, so much so in fact that for our purposes we can practically
regard them as an accomplished fact. (p. 12)
Sorting was another problem that concerned them, especially since at this point they still
thought in terms of the separable sorting, counting, and calculating steps of tabulator operations.
In fact, they note that computers using magnetic tape "are most efficient when the amount of
sorting involved is kept down to a minimum" (p. 12). Davis also noted the importance of
programming and the need to develop more efficient methods than were then available, including
developing libraries of standard procedures to draw upon (p. 14). Finally, he mentioned that at
least one of these machines (he was probably referring to the Univac) had a complex system for
checking results at each stage, a system which involved the use of a special pulse attached to each
character for the purposes of verification.
Insurance Applications
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After this brief consideration of the technology itself, Davis also summarized the
Committee's considerations of possible insurance uses of the new computers to explain why the
rest of the report focused on a particular application set (pp. 15-16). Not surprisingly, back in
1947 and 48 this committee of actuaries started by considering computation-intensive actuarial
investigations such as mortality studies and financial analyses. While these applications were
attractive to them and could certainly be handled by the technology, investigation convinced the
committee (as it had Berkeley) that the such work was generally not large enough in volume to
keep a computer busy enough to pay for itself. They then turned to operational applications.
The concept of maintaining a large electronic file of policy information that could be stored
compactly, updated electronically, and used to look up information on any policy was compelling
to them. Since large firms had literally millions of policies, electronic rather than paper or card
storage of policy records could save enormous amounts of space, as well as time. But the
Committee encountered two main problems. First, the technology at this stage simply did not
support efficient random access to policy information. Searching would have to be sequential and
thus too slow for many uses. Furthermore, there were significant issues concerning the legal
standing of such records, especially in magnetic tape form, to the various state insurance
departments and the courts as the primary records on policies:
For one thing, how do we know, for example, how long it would take for policy records
which are recorded on magnetic tape to be acceptable to the various Insurance Departments?
It has only been within the last few years that some State Insurance Departments have
accepted a printed form of annual statement. Microfilm copies are still not acceptable in
some courts. How acceptable a completely invisible magnetic tape record would be to the
business community at large certainly is a very important question and one that is not likely
to be resolved in a short time. We concluded, therefore, that regardless of how excellently
magnetic tape might substitute for existing kinds of policy records we would probably need
a visual record of the account with the policyholder which would be generally accepted by
the courts and regulatory bodies--at least until wide use of tape has become commonplace.
(p. 16)
Thus the Committee rejected this application, as well.
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Ultimately, like Berkeley, the Committee concluded that the real gains to be made with
electronic computers were in the areas of routine transactional processes, especially premium
billing and accounting. This task involved computing dividends and loan payments on policies,
sending out notices of premiums due and statements of values, and conducting the related
accounting and control functions. Thus it focused its attention on figuring out how best to use
computers, of both punched card and magnetic tape varieties, in such work.
The Committee established several principles or "guide posts" for such computer
applications:
1. An electronic computer should be applied to the whole job, not to some separately
departmentalized piece of it. [...]
2. Small jobs should be combined with others. [...]
3. Source records should be consolidated. [...]
4. Make all calculation at one time. [...]
5. Use a self-checking machine. [...] (pp. 22-23)
The first four principles (and particularly the first principle) were important in their implications for
firm structure. Clerical tasks in high volume insurance operations were quite subdivided, and
tabulating equipment, though itself often situated in a centralized tabulating department, had in
some ways exacerbated that subdivision. As noted in the earlier section on the tabulating era, in
the 1947 to 1952 period during which the Committee was doing its work some firms were
installing better integrated premium billing systems based on tabulating equipment. In most
insurance firms, however, different departments handled each aspect of servicing a policy (e.g.,
policy loan payments, though part of the premium billing process, were generally handled by a
separate department than that figuring the premiums). The Committee recommended handling such
jobs as a whole, as well as consolidating source records and different small jobs. The final
principle focused on the need for accuracy in conducting millions of operations, a concern to
Berkeley and other business users, as well.
The centerpiece of the Committee's work was what it termed the Consolidated Functions
Plan, which was intended to be a general plan applicable to both card- and tape-based computers,
and which was worked out and tested based on the procedures of one firm (clearly Metropolitan
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Life). In his section of the report, John J. Finelli described this plan as it would work on one
small-sized, card-based computer (which he identified in a later article [63] as the IBM Card
Programmed Calculator 23) and one tape-based computer (the Univac). Although this plan
consolidated several previously separated insurance tasks, as described above, it separated sorting
and output from the actual computing, delegating them to different machines and, in the case of
magnetic tape computers, to different media. In both cases, input was in the form of two eighty-
column cards (one with the address visibly typed on it, as well), though these were converted to
magnetic tape via a card-to-tape converter for the latter computer. In addition to retaining punched
cards, the plan also included one typed "history card" with a history of premium payments and
other facts. These three cards consolidated what had previously been 10 different cards or files of
various sorts (other check-off and accounting cards were created as by-products of the process, but
these cards were intended to be destroyed as soon as they had served their control purposes).
The description makes clear that much of the gain in performance came from this
consolidation of files and processes before the actual "computing," consolidation that could be
achieved with tabulating equipment [64]. The Committee saw the need for reconfiguring processes
or, as Davis put it in one paper, "a basic reengineering of present procedures" [65] to take
advantage of the equipment. Perhaps the most conservative aspect of the plan was the retention of
the humanly readable, typed history cards. Finelli justified the Committee's stance, saying "We
just do not believe that the time has yet come to completely dispense with readable card records of
this kind, and we do not have to in order to realize substantial economy with electronic computers"
(p. 41). Moreover, he justified retaining the punched cards even with the magnetic tape computer
by objecting to putting processes completely at the mercy of such new and not always dependable
machines: "To avoid to the degree possible a complete dependence on the operating effectiveness
23 The Committee worked out the procedures for the much larger IBM Selective Sequence Electronic
Calculator first, but then found that the results from the smaller and less expensive electronic punched
card calculator, the CPC, were nearly as good.
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of such complicated equipment, complete compatibility with punched card systems seems to be an
almost essential requirement" (p. 46).
The output procedures for both types of computers were designed to be independent of the
computer itself. For the card-based computer, an innovative photo-electric scanning system was to
be used for printing name and address information from the address card, saving the addition of
two or three more cards with that information encoded on punched cards. The rest of the
information (amount of premium, any dividends or loan payments, etc.) would be printed by the
high-speed printers used in conjunction with non-electronic tabulating machines. For the tape-
based computer, Finelli noted that current printing capabilities were still quite slow but that high-
speed printers are well along the development process and would soon be available. This
development was probably spurred by the demands of Berkeley and the Prudential, the Society of
Actuaries Committee, and others in life insurance and other industries for the better output
capabilities needed by information-intensive businesses, in contrast to the minimal output
capabilities demanded by defense and scientific work.
Implications of the Society of Actuaries Report
This insurance industry report highlights several issues in the continuing interaction
between it and the information processing industry. While Berkeley's actions on behalf of
Prudential might be attributed to idiosyncratic factors, the Society of Actuaries Committee clearly
represented multiple large players in the industry, who were determined both to stay informed and
to make potential vendors aware of their interest and needs. IBM and the Univac division of
Remington Rand were exhibiting equipment and sitting in the audience at the Special Meeting of
the Society of Actuaries where the 1952 report was presented. Univac clearly needed to attract
some such large business users and seems to have cooperated fully with the committee to give
them information on the tape-processing machine. IBM had an enormous installed base of
tabulating equipment in the insurance industry and was clearly monitoring the Committee's work
and cooperating, even though its commercially available computer technology was not as advanced
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as that of Univac at this stage. Both vendors and others were learning more about the industry's
needs, especially for verification, rapid sorting, and high-speed input and output. At a conference
on the development and use of the Univac held many decades later, Paul Chinitz, who worked for
Univac during this period, assessed the importance of this and later Society of Actuaries committee
study as follows:
The insurance industry had a forum, early, for the use of large computers. They
had the actuarial society committee studying that for many years so that the concept
and the results of that evaluation spread out on all the insurance companies. So I
think that the concept of the computer as an important [tool] by the insurance
industry was generated from within on that. I rather suspect that for a large number
of other industrial companies, the concept of going to a computer, or at least
investigating the thing, came by an osmosis from the publicity that was generated
not only by the election, but also by major insurance companies acquiring systems
and [using them successfully]. [66]
Thus he saw leaders in this industry as taking a proactive role in exploring computers and their
possible uses in insurance, and in spreading the word throughout that industry and ultimately
beyond to other commercial companies.
The Society's initial 1952 report also revealed the life insurance industry's progression
from seeing computers as actuarial devices to seeing them as operating workhorses such as
tabulating equipment had been. Further, we see that much of the gain from the new process the
Committee designed came from the reconfiguration of their own processes, rather than from the
computer technology itself. The Committee's work suggested that these machines were at a stage
of being useful and cost-effective for large firms, and might be shared by smaller and medium
sized firms. More conservative than Berkeley, the Committee saw computers as an important but
incremental improvement in current processes. It was cautious in its estimates of the potential
savings from reducing clerical labor. It anticipated a savings, but only a gradual reduction in the
clerical workforce, usually by attrition. In fact, no actual reduction in headcount would emerge in
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the next decade, but a slowing of rapid growth would be achieved [67]. Finally, the Committee
was cautious about any abandonment of punched cards and even of cards on which facts were
typed or posted by accounting machines. It foresaw the need for punched card duplicates of all
information stored on tape for a long time to come. This conservatism would appear more
frequently in the early years of insurance computing than Berkeley's relative willingness to
embrace magnetic tape, though even Berkeley wanted a visible medium for data back-up.
Conclusion: Early Interactions between Insurance and Computer Vendors
In this paper I have detailed the early interactions of Berkeley (acting for the Prudential)
with computer vendors and insurance societies, and of the Society of Actuaries (acting for the
insurance industry) Committee on New Recording Means and Computing Devices with computer
vendors and with broader insurance membership in the Society. All of these extensive and rich
interactions occurred during the period from 1948 through 1952, the period designated by Cortada
as one of little involvement with computers on the part of commercial firms, before actual
insurance company purchase and use of computers began in 1953/54.24 These findings thus
indicate the importance of Cortada's call for more industry-specific studies of early computer use.
Moreover, these interactions suggest that the theme of co-evolution of information
technology and its use in life insurance, previously established in study of the tabulator era,
continues into the early computer era. While life insurance's influence on the technology of
computing may not be as significant as that of government and defense, life insurance, along with
other commercial firms and industries, clearly did have an influence on input-output technology
and the ongoing importance of punched cards. While these technological aspects may seem
relatively minor in comparison to other aspects, they would be critical to computer success in
broader commercial markets. In this shaping role, insurance firms represented markets that would
be essential to vendors as they moved forward. Reciprocally, the interactions with vendors
influenced the view life insurance firms held of how they might use computers. These early
24 1 will discuss this period in a subsequent paper.
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interactions shifted attention from highly mathematical uses to operational uses, a shift that
reflected existing tabulator use and would be reflected in later computer use. They also suggested a
model for reengineering and integrating insurance processes (a trend which had also begun in the
late tabulator era) to make best use of computers, although in the early decades of computer use
this model was to be honored more in the breech than in the observance.
This paper, then, has contributed a close look at early interactions between computer
vendors and potential (soon to be actual) users of the technology. It helps computer historians
refine the time line of commercial knowledge of and interaction with computers and their vendors.
Moreover, it supports the growing body of literature mentioned at the beginning of this paper that
argues that even in such a "high tech" development as that of computers, users can play a
significant role in defining future technical and commercial development. Finally, it shows more
specifically than before the evolution of user attitudes about the technology that would shape, but
not determine (as future papers will show) their later adoption and use of this technology.
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